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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




BRANDON E., by and through his next friend, 
Robert Listenbee, Esq.; JOY E., by and through 
her next friend, Robert Listenbee, Esq., JOSH R., 
by and through his next friend, Wendie Ziegler, Esq.; 
individually and on behalf of themselves and all other 
persons similarly situated, 
 




ABRAM FRANK REYNOLDS, THE HONORABLE, 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court 
Division, on behalf of himself and all others similarly 
situated 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. No.: 98-cv-04236 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr., 
 
Argued: November 1, 1999 
 
Before: SCIRICA, NYGAARD and ROSENN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed January 14, 2000) 
 
       Marsha L. Levick (Argued) 
       Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia 
       801 Arch Street Sixth Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 




       A. Taylor Williams (Argued) 
       Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
       Administrative Office of PA Courts 
       1515 Market Street Suite 1414 
       Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
        Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal challenges the constitutionality of a state 
statute designed to assist parents in obtaining treatment 
for minors afflicted with a drug or alcohol dependency. The 
plaintiffs are three named minors who, on behalf of 
themselves and similarly situated minors, brought an 
action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 challenging the 
constitutionality of Act 53, a Pennsylvania statute enacted 
in 1997.1 See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 1690.112a (West 
Supp. 1999). The Act allows a minor's parents or a legal 
guardian who has custody of a minor to petition the court 
of common pleas of the judicial district in Pennsylvania 
where the minor is domiciled to order the involuntary 
commitment of the minor child to a drug and alcohol 
treatment program. The defendants are county judges 
responsible for presiding over Act 53 cases. They are sued 
only in their official capacity.2 The district court dismissed 
the action on the ground that the judges, as "neutral 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court postponed action on the motions to certify both a 
defendant and plaintiff class pending the resolution of a motion to 
dismiss the complaint. 
 
2. The defendant, Honorable Abram Frank Reynolds, is a judge on the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, responsible 
for hearing Act 53 cases in Philadelphia County. The Honorable 
Gwendolyn Bright is a judge in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 
Family Court Division, and the Honorable Paul Panepinto is the 
Administrative Judge for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 
Family Court Division. The Honorable Arthur E. Grim is a judge in the 
Berks County Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, and is 
responsible for hearing Act 53 cases in that county. 
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adjudicators" are not the proper parties to defend the 
constitutionality of this statute. The plaintiff timely 




Act 53 permits a parent or a guardian who has legal or 
physical custody of a minor to petition the court of common 
pleas of the jurisdictional district where the minor is 
domiciled for the commitment of the minor to involuntary 
drug and alcohol treatment services, including inpatient 
services, if the minor is incapable of accepting or unwilling 
to accept voluntary treatment. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
1690.112a (West Supp. 1999). The petition must set forth 
sufficient facts and good reason for the commitment. See 
id. 
 
Upon petition, the court assigned to hear the matter 
must appoint counsel for the minor. See id. The court also 
must order the minor who is alleged to have a drug or 
alcohol dependency to undergo a dependency assessment. 
See id. The assessment is to be performed by a psychiatrist, 
a licensed psychologist with training in drug and alcohol 
assessment, or a certified addiction counselor ("CAC"). See 
id. The assessment must include a recommended level of 
care and length of treatment. See id. Assessments 
completed by certified addiction counselors must be based 
on the Pennsylvania Department of Health approved drug 
and alcohol level of care criteria. See id. 
 
When the assessment is complete, the court must hold a 
hearing. See id. Before ordering the minor to undergo a 
period of involuntary commitment the court must: (1) hear 
the testimony of the person(s) who performed the 
assessment; (2) find by clear and convincing evidence that 
the minor is a drug-dependent person and that the minor 
is incapable of accepting or unwilling to accept voluntary 
treatment services; and (3) find that the minor will benefit 
from involuntary treatment services. See id. 
 
The father of plaintiff Brandon E. petitioned the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court 
Division, for involuntary commitment of Brandon for his 
alleged addiction to alcohol and marijuana. Judge Reynolds 
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held a hearing, at which time he ordered that Brandon be 
assessed for drug and alcohol dependence. That same day, 
a CAC performed the assessment at the Philadelphia Family 
Court using the Adolescent Problem Severity Index ("APSI"). 
 
At a subsequent hearing before Judge Reynolds, the CAC 
presented a written report and recommendation that 
advocated committing Brandon to an inpatient drug 
treatment program for a period of sixty to ninety days. 
Plaintiffs allege that to avoid involuntary commitment, 
Brandon elected to take part in an outpatient drug 
treatment program. Subsequent to the filing of the 
complaint, Brandon was adjudicated a delinquent child 
under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 6801 et 
seq. (West 1982), and Judge Reynolds dismissed the Act 53 
petition in September 1998. 
 
The mother of the plaintiff, Joy E., also filed an Act 53 
petition in Philadelphia Family Court in June 1998. 
According to plaintiffs, Joy appeared at a hearing before 
Judge Reynolds in July 1998, at which he ordered her 
assessment. A CAC then performed an evaluation using the 
APSI. The CAC did not prepare a written report of the 
results. At this same hearing, Judge Reynolds ordered Joy 
to undergo two urine tests each week and continued the 
hearing until August 1998. At the August hearing, the 
judge again ordered twice-weekly urine tests and continued 
the proceedings. At a subsequent hearing in September 
1998, Judge Reynolds dismissed the petition against Joy 
after emancipating her from the custody of her parents. 
 
The Act 53 petition against Josh R. was filed by his 
mother in March 1998, in the Berks County Juvenile 
Court. After his assessment, Josh voluntarily agreed to 
enter an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. 
Since the time of that agreement, Josh has been 
adjudicated a dependent child under the Juvenile Act, 42 
Pa. Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6301 et seq. (West 1990) and the 




The underlying question in these proceedings seeking a 
declaratory judgment is whether Act 53, which authorizes 
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county judges in Pennsylvania, on the petition of a parent 
or a legal guardian, to commit a minor to involuntary drug 
and alcohol treatment services if the minor is incapable or 
unwilling to accept voluntary treatment, is 
unconstitutional. However, the threshold and determinative 
question in this case is whether judges presiding over Act 
53 petitions as provided by the statute are proper parties to 
be named as defendants to an action brought under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 attacking the Act as unconstitutional. The 
district court thought they were not and granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss. In reviewing the district 
court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss the action, we 
exercise plenary review. See Coalition to Save Our Children 




The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit because it 
found that "the judges presiding over Act 53 proceedings 
are acting solely within their adjudicatory roles" and, 
therefore, are not proper parties to a suit challenging the 
Act's constitutionality. In this connection, the district court 
carefully analyzed the functions and duties of the judges in 
the application of Act 53 and aptly concluded that the 
common pleas judges were acting precisely as they do in 
any judicial proceeding. Specifically, the district court noted 
that the judges "do not have the power to initiate actions 
against minors" and that the Act does not "appear to 
delegate any administrative functions to the judges." 
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the suit for failure 
to state a claim for which relief may be granted. 
 
On appeal, plaintiffs contest the district court's dismissal 
on two grounds. Plaintiffs first argue that S 1983, as 
amended in 1996, expressly authorizes a suit for 
declaratory relief against a judge, who is acting in his or 
her judicial capacity, and that, therefore, the defendant 
judges are proper parties to the instant suit even though 
they are acting in their capacity as neutral adjudicators. 
Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that even if judges acting in 
their capacity as "neutral adjudicators" are not amenable to 
suit under S 1983, Act 53 "imposes non-judicial 
responsibilities on the judges sufficient to otherwise bring 
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them within the scope of S 1983." In this connection, 
plaintiffs assert that Act 53 strips the judge of his 
traditional role because in ordering an evaluation of the 
minor his function is purely ministerial. They further 
charge that in ordering a drug assessment of the minor, the 
judge is discharging a prosecutorial or investigatory role, 
and that the absence of a representative of the 
commonwealth or county at the hearing requires the judge 
"to juggle both his prosecutorial and judicial roles 
simultaneously." We reject both of the plaintiffs' arguments. 
 
Congress amended 42 U.S.C. S1983 in 1996 as part of 
the Federal Courts Improvement Act ("96 Amendments") for 
that year. As amended, S 1983 now provides: 
 
       Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of 
       any State, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
       citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 
       any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the 
       Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
       injured in . . . [a] suit in equity . . . except that in any 
       action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
       omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, 
       injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
       declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 
       was unavailable. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 (emphasis added). The italicized portion 
reflects the language Congress added to the statute by the 
`96 Amendments. 
 
The foregoing amendatory language to S 1983 does not 
expressly authorize suits for declaratory relief against 
judges. Instead, it implicitly recognizes that declaratory 
relief is available in some circumstances, and then limits 
the availability of injunctive relief to circumstances in 
which declaratory relief is unavailable or inadequate. The 
language is not an express authorization of declaratory 
relief, but simply a recognition of its availability or 
unavailability, depending on the circumstances, which the 
statute does not delineate. A review of the legislative history 
confirms this reading of the amendment. The Senate Report 
accompanying the amendment suggests that the 
amendment's purpose was to overrule the Supreme Court's 
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decision in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-543 (1984) 
(holding that judicial immunity was not a bar to awards of 
attorney's fees and costs or to demands for injunctive 
relief), not to alter the landscape of declaratory relief. See S. 
Rep. No. 104-366, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 
4217. 
 
Because the `96 amendments to S 1983 were not intended 
to alter the availability of declaratory relief against judicial 
officers, determining whether the declaratory relief is 
available in the instant case turns on whether the judges in 
this case properly may be named as defendants to this 
S 1983 action. The seminal case on the subject is In re 
Justices of The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 
(1st Cir. 1982). 
 
In that case, five attorney-plaintiffs sued the Puerto Rico 
Supreme Court and the Puerto Rico Bar association, 
attacking the constitutionality of statutes requiring 
members of the bar to support the bar association through 
dues payments. See id. at 19. Prior to the suit, the bar 
association had filed disciplinary complaints against some, 
but not all, of the attorney plaintiffs for non-payment of 
their dues. The Commonwealth's Supreme Court had 
determined that the bar requirements were valid. See id. 
When the attorney-plaintiffs filed suit against the justices, 
the justices immediately sought a writ of mandamus from 
the court of appeals ordering the district court to dismiss 
the complaint. See id. at 21. 
 
In support of their request for mandamus, the justices 
argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the 
matter under Article III because no "case or controversy" 
existed between the justices and the attorneys. In this 
connection, the justices argued that "they and the plaintiffs 
possess[ed] no . . . `adverse legal interest[s],' " for the 
Justices' only function concerning the statutes being 
challenged [was] to act as neutral adjudicators rather than 
as administrators, enforcers, or advocates." Id. (emphasis 
added). Addressing this argument, the First Circuit opined 
that "ordinarily, no `case or controversy' exists between a 
judge who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant 
who attacks the constitutionality of the statute." Id. The 
court gave a number of reasons in support of its opinion. 
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First, "[j]udges sit as arbiters without a personal or 
institutional stake on either side of the constitutional 
controversy." Id. Second, "[a]lmost invariably, they have 
played no role in the statute's enactment." Id. Third, " they 
have not initiated its enforcement." Id. Finally, "they do not 
even have an institutional interest in following their prior 
decisions (if any) concerning its constitutionality if an 
authoritative contrary legal determination has subsequently 
been made." Id. 
 
Nevertheless, rather than deciding the case on a 
constitutional basis, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit simply held that the justices were not proper parties 
under S 1983.3 See id.  at 22. The First Circuit explained 
that because judges who are not acting in an enforcement 
or administrative capacity have "no stake in upholding the 
statute against constitutional challenge . . . S 1983 does not 
provide relief against . . . [them] . . . any more than, say, a 
typical state's libel law imposes liability on a postal carrier 
or telephone company for simply conveying a libelous 
message." Id. Therefore, the court held that naming as 
defendants judges who act only as neutral arbiters in a 
dispute fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 
See id. 
 
Although this court has held judges amenable to suit 
under S 1983, its decision to do so is by no means 
inconsistent with the approach of the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit. In Georgevitch v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078 
(3d Cir. 1985)(En banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028 (1986), 
a class of state prisoners brought a S 1983 action against 
Pennsylvania common pleas judges alleging a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause in that they had not received 
the same parole procedures as other similarly situated 
prisoners. The judges, like the justices above, argued that 
they were not the proper parties to be sued because they 
were not enforcers of the parole statutes and therefore had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The other courts of appeals addressing the issue have also opted not 
to rest their decisions on the basis of Article III. See Grant v. Johnson, 
15 F.3d 146, 148 (1994); R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1224, 1232-33 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983); Mendez v. Heller, 380 F.Supp. 
985, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 437 (2d. Cir. 1976). 
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no interests adverse to the prisoners. See id. at 1087. In 
rejecting the judges' argument, this court expressly found 
that the parole statute placed the judges in the identical 
position as the parole board, which was clearly amenable to 
suit, when making parole decisions regarding classes of 
prisoners. See id. at 1087-88. We then cited In re Justices 
of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico with approval and 
stated that this is not a case in which judges are sued in 
their judicial capacity as neutral adjudicators of disputes, 
but rather as enforcers of the statutes. We, therefore, found 
"no basis for distinguishing the role of the sentencing 
judges from that of the Board; therefore, there is no reason 
why the Board, but not the judges, may be sued on a 
similar challenge." Id. at 1088. 
 
Thus, although in Georgevitch we held the judges 
amenable to suit under S 1983, our decision nevertheless 
recognized the impropriety of such suits where the judge 
acted as an adjudicator rather than an enforcer or 
administrator of a statute. 
 
Turning to the present case, the facts reveal that the 
plaintiffs are suing judges who are neutral adjudicators and 
not enforcers or administrators. In presiding over Act 53 
petitions, the judges do not initiate the proceedings against 
the minor. The proceedings must be undertaken by the 
minor's parent or legal guardian by filing a petition setting 
forth "sufficient facts and good reason for the commitment." 
See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1690.112a(a). To emphasize 
the informality of the proceedings and minimize their 
adversarial character, the petition does not require an 
attorney at law or a prosecuting attorney. Judges, however, 
are required to appoint counsel for the minor and order an 
assessment of his or her alleged drug or alcohol 
dependency. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 1690.112(b). 
When the assessment has been completed, the statute 
requires the judge to hold a hearing and make factual 
determinations. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 1690.112a(c). 
The judge must determine whether the minor is a"drug- 
dependent person," a mixed question of law and fact typical 
to the adjudicative setting. See id. The judge must also 
determine whether the minor is unwilling or unable to 
accept voluntary treatment services. See id. Finally, the 
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judge must determine whether the minor will benefit from 
involuntary treatment services. See id. 
 
The judge's position in the Act 53 proceeding is simply 
not adverse to that of the minor, even though the 
Commonwealth or the County is not required to have 
counsel present. The plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary 
are unpersuasive. The plaintiffs first argue that because the 
judge must order a drug and alcohol assessment upon 
filing of a petition without any adjudicatory process, this 
demonstrates that the process is not actually adjudicatory. 
However, this argument that the judge must immediately 
order an assessment without the exercise of any 
adjudicatory process misreads the statute. The statute 
requires that a petition set forth sufficient facts and good 
reason for the commitment and then states that upon such 
petition the court shall order an assessment. See 71 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1690.112a(a)-(b). The statute does not 
contemplate a rubber stamp process. Rather, the statute 
contemplates that prior to ordering an assessment, the 
judge will first ascertain whether the petition sets forth 
sufficient facts and good reason. Thus, the premise of the 
plaintiffs' first argument is flawed. 
 
Plaintiffs' next argument is equally unpersuasive. They 
appear to argue that the judge's traditional role is 
compromised by the Act 53 process because there is no 
separate prosecutor or solicitor other than the parent. The 
lack of such a prosecutor, argue the plaintiffs, requires the 
judge to "juggle both his prosecutorial and judicial roles 
simultaneously" because the judge must undertake the 
"non-judicial" task of calling the assessor to testify and 
then revert to the role of adjudicator in determining how to 
weigh that testimony. Plaintiffs' argument, however, 
basically boils down to a challenge to the informal 
procedures in an Act 53 petition. That the process may be 
informal does not alter the position of the judges as neutral 
arbiters over petitions commenced by the parent or legal 
guardian of the minor. The Supreme Court has noted that 
"[s]tate judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are 
called upon to settle a minor's claim," and that such an act 
is a judicial one in nature. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 
349, 362-363 (1978). Although the plaintiffs claim that the 
 
                                10 
  
ordering of an assessment is commensurate to "a state 
prosecutor ordering police surveillance of an area during 
the pre-indictment investigation of an alleged crime," we are 
not convinced that the analogy accurately characterizes the 
role of the judges under Act 53. 
 
For the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, we too hold it unnecessary to decide the role 
of the judges under Act 53 on a constitutional basis. 
Because the judges presiding over Act 53 proceedings are 
acting in their capacity as neutral adjudicators, the district 
court committed no error in dismissing the suit for failure 




For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
granting dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) will be affirmed. 
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